

Migration in Ethiopia: History, Current Trends and Future Prospects

Paper Series: Migration and Development Country Profiles

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December 2009

Maastricht Graduate School of Governance



Ministry of Foreign Affairs



Maastricht Graduate School of Governance (MGSoG)



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1. Introduction

It is estimated that in 2010, 10.2 percent of global migrants will hail from Africa (UNDP, 2009). Only three percent of the world migrates, and around 1.9 percent of Africa's population engages in international migration (UNDP, 2009). This is not surprising, however, as it is well documented in migration studies that the "poorest of the poor" do not migrate, and Sub-Saharan Africa is the poorest region in the world. Migration flows from Sub-Saharan Africa are thus occurring within a context of extreme poverty, conflict, and the HIV/AIDS pandemic, all of which impact migration dynamics (Adepoju, 2008).

Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world and in 2005 had an emigration rate of 0.6 percent, which is low in comparison to Africa as a whole. Ethiopia faces complex challenges of food insecurity, overpopulation, drought, political instability, and ethnic conflict. In addition to these issues, Ethiopia faces large challenges with respect to migration flows.

From the 1980s onward, the Horn of Africa, which consists of Eritrea, Sudan, Djibouti, Somalia, and Ethiopia, became the largest refugee-producing area in the world, with Ethiopia being the largest contributor to the refugee flows (Bariagaber, 1999). As a consequence, Ethiopia became internationally known for its refugee crisis, including problems of managing refugee flows and the issue of repatriation. Today the number of Ethiopians seeking refuge in other countries has drastically decreased.

Political instability in the 1970s and the large refugee flows of the 1980s led to the development of the Ethiopian Diaspora, which today is actively engaged in political and development processes in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Diaspora is one of the largest of all African countries and is concentrated primarily in the United States and United Kingdom. Remittances to Ethiopia from the Diaspora provide an integral source of income for families to sustain themselves through external shocks and meet their basic needs.

Internal migration flows in Ethiopia are currently larger than external flows, but the exact number of people who migrate internally is not known. Internal migration occurs in the form of rural-urban migration, rural-rural migration, and resettlement policies, which are all substantial in Ethiopia. Internal migration in Ethiopia has traditionally occurred at marriage when the wife moves to live in the husband's community. In addition to this traditional internal mobility, urbanization in Ethiopia is a growing trend that puts pressure on urban infrastructure and resources (De Waal, 1991; Ezra & Kiros, 2001).

The objective of this paper is to provide an overview of migration and development in Ethiopia. This will be achieved through a discussion of historical and contemporary migration patterns (Section 3 and 4), the Ethiopian Diaspora (Section 5), the development impacts of migration in Ethiopia (Section 6), migration policies in Ethiopia (Section 7), an exploration of the migration relationship between the Netherlands and Ethiopia (Section 8), and a conclusion that examines potential future migration flows in Ethiopia (Section 9).

2. General Country Profile of Ethiopia

Ethiopia is a poor country that has struggled with drought, famines, overpopulation, poverty, and political instability. Ethiopia is a part of the 'cradle of civilization' and is one of the few countries to never be colonized. This has not, however, prevented the country from suffering ethnic conflict and political instability. Today Ethiopia is officially a democratic country, although in practice this would be disputed. The volatile politics and ethnic conflict have contributed to poor governance which, combined with overpopulation and drought, have led to devastating impacts for Ethiopians during the country's famines, resettlement programmes, and political repression. This section will provide a general overview of the current situation in Ethiopia by looking at the current population and economic situation; the political situation; environment, natural disasters, and food security; culture, and; the status of women.

2.1 Population and economic situation

Ethiopia is one of the most populous countries in Africa with a population of 83 million (US Department of State, 2009). In 2006 83.7 percent of the population was living in rural areas, and 16.3 percent was living in urban areas. The population is thus heavily concentrated in agricultural activities (World Development Indicators, 2008). In 2008 the population growth rate was 3.21 percent, which was the 11th highest in the world (CIA World Factbook).

Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world, ranking 169 of 179 on the United Nations Develop Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index. Forty-four percent of the population lives below the national poverty index, and 77.5 percent lives on less than \$2 per day. Life expectancy is 55.4 years, and the literacy rate is 35.9 percent. Thirty-eight percent of children under 5 are underweight for their age.

The majority of the population is involved in agriculture (80 percent), which accounts for 46 percent of GDP. The government owns all of the land, and the average plot of land worked per family is one hectare. The majority of land is used for self-sufficiency, and the main cash crops for export are coffee and cereals. The increasing population puts further pressure on the land, making attainment of self-sufficiency more challenging. In addition, only one percent of arable land is irrigated; thus, droughts have a devastating effect, which was witnessed during Ethiopia's famines (Financial Standards Forum, 2009)

In the urban communities there is high unemployment, estimated at 48 percent for men between 15 and 30 years of age. Unemployment generally lasts for a number of years. This has led to the growth of the informal economy, which the ILO estimates to account for 70-80 percent of the workforce (Financial Standards Forum, 2009).

2.2 Political situation

Ethiopia is the only African country that was not a colony, with the exception of a brief Italian invasion from 1936-41. Historically emperors ruled the country, but in 1974 the last Emperor, Haile Salisse, was overthrown by the military, which established a socialist rule known as the 'Derg' (committee). The Derg established totalitarian rule where civil liberties were limited.

In 1991 the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Party (EPRDP), a coalition consisting of different ethnic groups, overthrew the Derg regime. A transitional government was established, and in

1993 Eritrea separated from Ethiopia. In 1994 Ethiopia's Constitution was established, and in 1995 the country had its first elections. From 1998-2000 Ethiopia and Eritrea were at war until the signing of a peace treaty in 2000, but tensions still remain high along the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

The constitution established Ethiopia as an ethnic federalist state with nine regional states based on the predominant ethnic groups, with the exception of two federal territories, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa (Habtu, 2003), as illustrated in Figure 1. The establishment of ethnic federalism led to high amounts of internal migration as people moved to live within their ethnic territory. The states are largely autonomous within the federal structure.

Figure 1: Map of the Ethnically-based Regional States of Ethiopia



Source: BBC News, 2005.

The current Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, has been in power since 1995, leading the state with a heavy hand. The last elections in 2005 were cited with irregularities and fraud, and there is concern about the legitimacy of the May 2010 elections. Political freedoms are repressed in Ethiopia with state control of the media, limited academic freedom, and intolerance for opposition toward the government. International human rights groups, such as Human Rights Watch, have reported politically-motivated killings (HRW, 2009).

2.3 Environment, natural disasters, and food security

Food security is an area of critical concern in Ethiopia, as much of the rural population lives in constant food insecurity. The Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) estimates that 44 percent of the national population is undernourished (2009). Chronic food insecurity in Ethiopia is due to recurrent drought, degradation of natural resources, and rapid population growth (FAO, 2009). In recent history Ethiopia has experienced catastrophic famines in 1973, 1977-78, 1983-84, 1987-88, and 1993. The famine of 1983-84 was the most severe and left over 1 million people dead. This famine remains strong in the memory of Ethiopians.

Ethiopia is a regular recipient of global food aid, and even in a year of good rains and harvest, it is estimated that five million people in Ethiopia would require food aid (GFDRE 2003 in Hammond, 2008: 522). In November 2009 Ethiopia experienced the beginning of another food crisis, which is still ongoing.

The World Food Programme (2009) is currently requesting further food aid for 10 million people who have been impacted by drought and 6.2 million people who are threatened by hunger and malnutrition and require urgent food aid. Food security continues to be a challenge for Ethiopia and is a key driver of historical and current migration trends in Ethiopia.

2.4 Culture and ethnicity

There are over 77 different ethnic groups in Ethiopia. The largest is the Oromo (40 percent), Amhara (25 percent), and Tigray (7 percent). The most common religion is Sunni Muslim (45-50 percent), Ethiopian Orthodox Christian (40 percent), and Protestant (5 percent). The official language is Amharic, which is the mother tongue of approximately 20 percent of the population (Bulcha, 1997). Oromo is the most commonly spoken language and has many different dialects.

Present-day Ethiopia emerged from the Abyssinian Empire that came to rule in the 12th Century. The Amhara and Tigray ethnic groups are both descendants of the peoples of the Abyssinian Empire. The Amhara ethnic group had led Ethiopia until the ERPDF coup in 1991.

Tensions between and among ethnic groups continue in Ethiopia. Until 1991 the Oromo were not equal to the Amhara and were not permitted to display any manifestations of their language or culture, enter politics, or educate their children (Bulcha, 2002). Oromo people still continue to report injustices against them by the current government.

2.5 Status of women

The ethnic groups of Ethiopia are traditionally patriarchal and are based on gendered role division. In rural areas women traditionally have the role in the household economy of engaging in agricultural trade and domestic services (Pankhurst 1990, in van Blerk, 2007). In the division of labour in tasks such as cloth making, it is evident that women are allocated simple and repetitive tasks (such as spinning) while the men do skilled tasks such as the weaving (ibid.).

Marriages are traditionally arranged to create further community ties and to increase or maintain the family's social status (Alemu, 2007). The average national age of females at the time of marriage in Ethiopia is 14, when young girls marry older men in polygamous marriages (Alemu, 2007, p. 1). Among the Amhara 48 percent of rural women and 28 percent of urban women were married before the age of 15 (Alemu, 2007, p. 1). Ethiopian law states that women must be a minimum of 18 years old to marry, but this is weakly enforced (Alemu, 2007, p. 2). Child marriages lead to low education for girls and increased health risks. In some cases the practice of Telfa still remains, which is a cultural practice by which a girl is abducted and taken into marriage when the parents have not consented (Pankhurst 1992, in van Blerk, 2007). Once the girl is taken she is considered married, and the family will not reverse the decision (van Blerk, 2007). Divorce is also prevalent in Ethiopia due to the ease with which men can divorce their wives for reasons such as disobedience, barrenness, challenging male authority, and not keeping the house properly; this places women in a precarious position (Pankhurst 1992, in van Blerk, 2007).

Ethiopia's GDI (Gender Development Index) value is 0.403, which is 97.3 percent of its Human Development Index (HDI) (UNDP, 2009). The HDI does not account for gender inequality, and the GDI adds this component to the HDI. Ethiopia ranks 133 in the world for its GDI. This is illustrated by such indicators as literacy: 50 percent of adult males are literate compared to 22.8 percent of adult females

(UNDP, 2009). The status of women is reflected later in this paper, as trafficking of women is an area of growing concern in Ethiopia.

3. Historic Overview of Migration in Ethiopia

As described in the previous chapter, Ethiopia has experienced political instability, war, famine, and economic hardship over the course of its history. These issues characterised the entire Horn of Africa region. As a result, Ethiopia has known many types of migration over the years. It has been both an origin and a destination country for either voluntary or involuntary migrants, and many migrants have also used it as a transit area. Moreover, Ethiopia has known large internal migration flows. This chapter provides a historic overview of these different types of migration in Ethiopia and discusses the root causes that created these migration flows. The focus will be on the period between roughly 1970 and 2000. Since Ethiopia's migration flows are heavily interlinked with regional issues, a description of migration patterns in the Horn of Africa is presented first.

3.1 Migration patterns in the Horn of Africa

The migration problem in the Horn of Africa has been substantial in the past four decades. During the period between 1978 and 1995, flows of refugees in the region peaked (Bariagaber, 2006). The political overthrow of the Ethiopian Imperial Government in 1974, the independence struggle of Eritrea, the war between Ethiopia and Somalia between 1977 and 1978, and the civil conflict in Sudan and Somalia in the 1980s have all been mentioned as major catalysts of large involuntary movements of people in the region (Bariagaber, 1997). Exploring the causes of the migration patterns in the Horn of Africa is complex due to the fact that there are so many agents present at the same time. To quote Bariagaber (1999, p. 599):

“Untangling the causes of refugee formations in the Horn of Africa requires examination of a host of factors, including ethnic and religious conflicts, irredentist and separatist-inspired violence, international war between countries in the region, and intervention in domestic conflicts by external powers”

Apart from war and political issues, ecological factors are also seen as drivers of population movements in the Horn of Africa (Berhanu & White, 2000; De Waal, 1991). Governments also played a large role in manipulating population movements, often out of security reasons (Bariagaber, 1999). This aspect will be discussed in more detail in the following section.

The refugee crisis that eventually developed in the Horn of Africa is complex. Refugee flows have shown variations over time and over countries, but variations can also be seen within countries over time (Bariagaber, 1999). Moreover, the refugee crisis in the Horn of Africa is different from other refugee crises in the world, due to different factors. First, the area has seen substantial interventions by external, international actors, which often led to an intensification of conflict. Second, due to inter-linkages of political issues in the region, all countries became sending, transit, and destination countries for refugees, often at the same time. These refugees were often used as ‘bargaining’ objects in political matters, which in turn made the political conflicts more intense: “The nature of the conflicts [...] and the accompanying refugee formations in the region, have become temporally more enduring, spatially more extensive, emotionally more intense, and less amenable to compromise and negotiated solutions” (Bariagaber, 1999, p. 601).

The Horn of Africa became internationally known for its refugee problem mainly because of the high number of refugees: millions of people crossed the borders of their countries to seek refuge elsewhere (see Table 1). Their living conditions in, for example, refugee camps were often horrendous. After 1986 the Horn of Africa became the top refugee-sending region in Africa (Bariagaber, 1999). Most of the refugees in the area, however, were migrants from Ethiopia, moving to neighboring countries Somalia, Djibouti, and the Sudan. The country has seen tremendous displacement of people, compared to other African countries. In the next sections, the Ethiopian case will be discussed in more detail.

Table 1: Refugees in Africa and the Horn of Africa: 1974-1995

Year	Refugees in Africa	Refugees in the Horn of Africa	Percentage of Refugees from the Horn of Africa
1974	1,105,217	66,700	6.04
1977	1,692,041	102,000	6.03
1980	4,045,200	323,000	7.98
1983	1,921,000	907,100	47.22
1986	3,112,950	1,622,869	52.13
1989	4,524,800	1,893,800	41.18
1992	5,340,800	1,676,800	31.40
1995	5,222,000	1,355,900	25.97

Source: Bariagaber, 1999.

3.2 International migration from Ethiopia and its root causes

Until the early 1990s, Ethiopia was one of the largest producers of migrants in Africa (Bariagaber, 1999). An overview of refugee flows in the Horn of Africa and Ethiopia is presented in Table 2. As this table shows, the number of refugees from Ethiopia increased from 55,000 in 1972 to over a million in 1992. Even though Ethiopia has experienced migratory flows throughout its history, the movement of Ethiopian civilians became substantially greater in the late 1960s and 1970s (Berhanu, Kassahun, Seid & Zekarias, 2004). Especially after the 1974 revolution, large migration flows started to arise. Most of the migrants from Ethiopia were refugees, escaping political conflict, famine, and persecution (Bariagaber, 1997), often by their own government (De Waal, 1991). The refugees from Ethiopia are depicted as “[...] a mass of fleeing individuals primarily interested in safely and quickly reaching neighboring countries” (Bariagaber, 1997, p. 27). Motives to flee have changed over time, however. Migrants initially fled for political reasons and to escape conflict. In later years the motives of Ethiopian migrants to flee their country shifted to more economic motives (ibid.). In the following paragraphs, these motivations will be discussed in more detail.

Table 2: Refugees in the Horn of Africa and Ethiopia: 1972-1992

Year	Refugees in the Horn of Africa	Refugees from Ethiopia	Percentage of Refugees from Ethiopia
1972	55,000	55,000	100.00
1977	102,000	91,000	89.22
1982	1,091,000	1,081,500	99.13
1987	1,343,300	1,122,300	83.55
1992	1,676,800	752,400	44.87

Source: Bariagaber, 1997.

3.2.1 Conflict and political violence

As described earlier, conflict has characterized Ethiopia for decades, and many Ethiopian citizens were forced to flee their home to escape violence. Ethiopia has been in a cycle of political violence for decades: “Violence [...] served as an important means of seeking political aims and at the same time produced ensuing cycles of reprisals and counter reprisals that generated refugee flows out of Ethiopia” (Bariagaber, 1997, p. 33).

According to Bariagaber (1999), the root causes of conflict in Ethiopia were threefold. First, Ethiopian governments played a large role in pushing refugee flows by oppressing certain ethnic groups within society and by striving for political centralization. Second, the ongoing independence struggle of Eritrea led to violent clashes in the North, which mainly affected rural areas. The war with Eritrea started around 1961 and lasted until 1991, the year in which Eritrea became independent. The conflict resulted in a death toll of around 300,000 Ethiopian citizens, mainly from rural areas, and many refugees (Bariagaber, 1997). Third, the war with Somalia over the Ogaden region in Ethiopia in 1977 and 1978 made thousands of Ethiopians flee to Somalia. This generated massive refugee flows in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s (Bariagaber, 1997). Other political factors that have generated large refugee flows from Ethiopia relate to the period of Red Terror, a violent political campaign of the Ethiopian government for the Derg which took place between 1976 and 1979 (De Waal, 1991), and, in the 1980s, the opposition of armed groups to the Megistu regime (*ibid.*) (see Section 2).

3.2.2 Ecological degradation, famine, and poverty

Apart from war and political violence, ecological degradation, famine, and poverty are historically among the major causes of migration in Ethiopia (Berhanu & White, 2000; De Waal, 1991; Ezra 2001; Ezra & Kiros, 2001). Migration as a result of low opportunities or poor living conditions is often seen as a form of household income diversification (see e.g. Wouterse & Taylor, 2008). Some household members migrate to areas with better opportunities while other household members stay at their original location and benefit from, for example, remittances. This has also been the case for some Ethiopian households in drought-prone areas (UNDP, 2009).

Since the largest share of Ethiopia’s economy is based on agriculture, the country is highly vulnerable to ecological factors such as droughts. One major drought took place between 1964 and 1965, and in the period 1973-1974, a large famine, also caused by low rainfall, affected the whole country. Over the years many people responded to these ecological changes by moving from, as Ezra and Kiros (2001, p. 749) call it: “[...] relatively dense population and low economic opportunity areas to areas of less density and greater opportunity”. This dislocation was not always voluntary, however. Between 1984 and 1985, for

example, another famine took place that led the government to resettle around 600,000 rural citizens from Central and Northern Ethiopia to Southern and Western Ethiopia (Rahmato, 1989). Both Ethiopia and Eritrea were affected by the famine, and many refugees also fled from these countries to Sudan (Bariagaber, 1997).

The effects of conflict and poverty issues on migration patterns are considerable. The conflicts in Ethiopia severely damaged agricultural capital, thereby hindering agricultural practices. This, in turn, led to poverty, which caused large migration movements of people seeking better living conditions elsewhere (De Waal, 1991). Military actions of the Ethiopian government directed at its own citizens often destroyed agricultural assets, which further produced poverty and famine (Bariagaber, 1997). Moreover, it is often a mixture of motivations that drive people to seek refuge somewhere else (Bariagaber, 1997). This was the case, for example, in 1984 and 1985 when both a famine and a political conflict between the Ethiopian government and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) took place in the north of Ethiopia, leading to massive migration flows to Sudan (ibid.). Bariagaber (1997), therefore, argues that ecological factors alone, such as drought, did not cause large involuntary movements in Ethiopia over the course of history. The 1973 drought, for example, "[...] that is estimated to have killed about 300,000 people in Tigray and other places in Northern Ethiopia did not generate sizable refugee flows to Sudan" (p. 32). He argues that the best predictor of involuntary population movements in Africa is a so-called push factor: the existence and extent of political violence in a country.

To conclude, the major factors driving Ethiopian migrants over the years were economic, political, and environmental, factors that were all heavily interlinked and intertwined with regional issues. This mixture of causes, and the magnitude of the refugee crisis that it generated, is what makes the Horn of Africa, and Ethiopia in particular, such a complex case in terms of migration. In the next sections, repatriation issues and rural-urban migration patterns are addressed.

3.3 Repatriation

As a result of the large refugee flows, questions arose as to how to deal with the large number of displaced persons. Repatriation is often seen as the best solution to refugee crises (Black & Koser, 1999), but repatriation of refugees in the Horn of Africa has proven to be problematic over the years, mainly due to the complexity of refugee flows and the fact that countries both send and receive refugees simultaneously (Bariagaber, 1999). Ethiopia has always been a special case as well due to the high number of refugees. In the 1980s, for example, nearly two million Ethiopians lived abroad, and ninety percent of them lived in neighbouring countries Sudan and Somalia. In addition, the refugee flows in the Horn of Africa emerged within a very short time frame. Within thirty years, from the 1970s on, the Horn of Africa became the number one refugee-sending region in the world (Bariagaber, 1999). This made it difficult for all actors involved to respond to the refugee crisis.

Repatriation of refugees has also been difficult since many actors were involved in the repatriation decision-making processes. The main actors were host and home states, local and international organizations, and the refugees or their families (Bariagaber, 1999; Black & Koser, 1999). All actors had different goals and strategies, which created tensions. Countries often do not have the financial means to take back the repatriated refugees after conflict. Therefore, in the Horn of Africa, home states often took a pragmatic approach when dealing with repatriation (Bariagaber, 1999). This was the case for Ethiopia when refugees were to repatriate from Sudan in the 1980s. The refugees were few, and their return did not put a

strain on the country's resources. This made repatriation more acceptable for the Ethiopian government than when the refugee group had been large.

External factors also played a role in repatriation issues in Ethiopia. In the 1980s and 1990s, many Ethiopian refugees were repatriated from Somalia. At that time, however, Somalia experienced a civil war, which made many refugees flee again to their home country (Bariagaber, 1999). As a result of the Somali civil war, Ethiopia had to deal with a high number of Somali refugees again.

Repatriation poses serious challenges to the individuals or families involved and is often more difficult for refugees from conflict areas, since conflict destroyed their livelihoods (Hammond, 1999). When Ethiopian refugees repatriated from Sudanese refugee camps in 1993, for example, they found upon return that they had lost their land rights. Apart from that, however, 25,000 returnees eventually successfully repatriated to the area from which they had fled (Hammond, 2005). Refugees often do not even want to go back to their hometowns, leading to involuntary repatriation (Black & Koser, 1999). Only few Ethiopians repatriated from Sudan in 1982 and 1983 after amnesty promises by the new government, for instance (Bulcha, 1988).

3.4 Internal migration

Migration within Ethiopian borders has been common as well, mainly in the form of rural-urban migration flows. Resettlement programmes by the Ethiopian governments have also resulted in large internal migration flows. These two internal migration patterns are discussed in the following section. This section on Ethiopian internal migration unfortunately cannot be supported by data due to a lack of available and reliable data on this issue. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), no attempts have been made by the Ethiopian government or international organizations to estimate the number of internally displaced people (IDPs). Moreover, international organizations and media often lack access to areas in Ethiopia (IDMC, 2009b).

3.4.1 Rural-urban migration

De Waal (1991) argues that many migrants in Ethiopia fled the rural areas for urban areas in the period 1961 to 1991. Berhanu and White (1998) also reported an increase in rural-urban migration of women between 1960 and 1989. These studies are in line with recent African urbanization trends, showing increasing levels of urbanization in developing countries (Van Dijk & Fransen, 2008). According to the authors, "the rapid rate of urbanization is primarily caused by poor rural living conditions and persistent famine, forcing rural populations to migrate to cities in search of alternative livelihoods" (Van Dijk & Fransen, 2008, p. 3).

The rural-urban migration trend in Ethiopia can be explained by a number of so-called push and pull factors (see e.g. Kunz, 1973). Ezra and Kiros (2001) summarize the main push factors in Ethiopia as being overpopulation, famine, poverty, land scarcity, governmental agricultural policies, and a lack of agricultural resources, all factors that have been discussed previously. Many households, however, also participate in seasonal labor activities, leading to temporary rural-urban migration. As an addition to these push factors, many rural civilians were pulled to Ethiopian urban areas in the post-revolution period in Ethiopia as a result of the development of these areas into more important business and political centers

(Berhanu & White, 2000). Before the early 1970's, Addis Ababa was the most important urban destination for Ethiopians moving from the rural areas. After 1974 a shift to other Ethiopian cities occurred (ibid.). In Ethiopia urbanization levels are still relatively low as compared to other African countries (Cohen, 2006), even though Ethiopian urbanization rates are currently high (Van Dijk & Fransen, 2008).

3.4.2 Resettlement

Successive conflicts in Ethiopia were heavily characterized by volatile behaviour of the Ethiopian army to its own civilians. One of the methods the Ethiopian army used to execute power was the forced relocation and resettlement of people living in rural areas (De Waal, 1991). The process of 'villagization' involved the relocation of civilians into government villages, which were highly monitored by the army. The goal of the government was to redistribute the rural population into farming cooperatives, officially as a means to deal with famine. According to De Waal (1991, p. 5) however, "The government's resettlement programme was a disaster when considered from almost every angle, and killed a minimum of 50,000 people". Many rural civilians fled to Ethiopia's cities to escape the poor living conditions in the government's resettlements (Berhanu & White, 2000) while others fled to neighboring countries (Bariagaber, 1999).

4. Current Migration Patterns

Current migration patterns in Ethiopia are driven by the same factors that led to historical migration flows. As was described in the previous chapter, past Ethiopian migration flows were mainly generated by political violence, poverty, famine, and limited opportunities. Estimates of the number of internal migrants are not available; however, it is evident from existing studies that approximately 50 to 70 percent of the population migrates temporarily or permanently (Mberu, 2006). International migration is similarly driven by the desire for better opportunities, but it is currently far less common than internal migration. In the next sections, both current internal and international Ethiopian migration patterns will be discussed.

4.1 Internal Migration

Internal migration flows within Ethiopia are currently larger than international migration flows from Ethiopia. The IDMC (2009b) estimates that there are currently 300,000 IDPs in Ethiopia compared to around 60,000 refugees that currently reside in other countries (UNCHR, 2009). Apart from the IDPs, the primary internal migration flows are rural-urban migration, and rural-rural migration. In addition to these flows, the resettlement programme of the current government and the trafficking of children are also significant contributors to current migration flows in Ethiopia. Internal migration flows and their causes will be described in detail below.

4.1.1 Rural-urban migration

Urbanization, as discussed in the previous section, is an issue of growing concern in Ethiopia. Rural-urban migration is continuing to occur at high levels as people seek new opportunities in the city to escape rural poverty. Ethiopia's urban centres, such as Addis Abbaba, have high unemployment rates. This has led to shift in rural poverty to urban poverty. An additional area of increasing concern in Ethiopia has been the rural-urban migration of children who move to the cities to find opportunities (Erulkar et al, 2006). Rural to urban migration among youth between 10 and 19 years of age occurred primarily for educational opportunities (44.9 percent of boys and 51.4 percent of girls), followed by work opportunities (28.6 percent of boys and 32.4 percent of girls) and escaping an early marriage (22.7 percent of girls) (Erulkar et al., 2006, p. 368). Children often migrate with a relative or family friend or are sent to live with family or friends in the city who are expected to educate the children while they help in the house. After migration, however, 13 percent of girls and 21 percent of males do not attend school and 19 percent of females who migrated for work were not employed (Erulkar et al., 2006, p. 368). The opportunities for work are limited to informal work such as domestic work, coffee shop assistant, or bar girl (Van Blerk, 2007, p. 248). The latter-most option is often an entry into the sex industry, where girls commonly end up. Erulkar et al. (2006) found that female migrants working in domestic labour jobs received lower wages than their natives cohorts per week (16 Birr/week versus 50 Birr/week). The opportunities for rural migrants in urban areas are limited, and life in cities frequently does not meet expectations.

4.1.2 Rural-rural

Rural-to-rural migration in Ethiopia continues to occur along traditional lines of marriage and is increasingly occurring as an adaptation strategy to poor agricultural and living conditions. The 1998 Migration, Gender, and Health Survey was conducted in five regions of Ethiopia among 1554 household heads to gain an understanding of the impact of internal migration in Ethiopia (Mberu, 2006). The study compared living conditions between permanent migrants, temporary migrants, and non-migrants (Mberu, 2006). The results indicate that high levels of internal migration are occurring as both an adaptation mechanism and survival strategy (Mberu, 2006, p. 530). There are significant living condition advances made by permanent and temporary migrants over non-migrants due to factors such as permanent migrants' abilities to get jobs in the non-agricultural sector and temporary migrants' abilities to improve their education and receive better employment opportunities (Mberu, 2006). In addition there was a negative association with the living conditions of returnees compared to non-migrants, suggesting that return occurred when the migration experience had failed (Mberu, 2006).

4.1.3 Resettlement

The government of Ethiopia began a new resettlement programme in 2003 as part of the National Food Security Strategy. The goal was to resettle 2.2 million people from the chronically food-insecure highlands to the fertile agricultural lowlands within three years, and the programme encompassed the Tigray, Oromia, Amhara, and SNNPR regions (IDMC, 2007). Resettlers received a plot of land, some start-up supplies, and eight months of food rations. The government has hailed the programme as a success, but there has been much critique of the programme.

Hammond (2008) conducted research on the resettlement programme for USAID-Ethiopia and was one of few academics/press allowed into the resettlement camps. Hammond's research indicates high levels of dissatisfaction with the programme. Government officials carrying out the programme administered it as an emergency measure, and people were sometimes not given even a day's notice of their move. Individuals were not allowed sufficient time to make their decisions, the information they received was minimal and often incorrect, and they were not allowed to take any furniture or household items with them. There was miscommunication among all levels in administering the programme; a government official stated they were setting estimates for resettlement whereas on the ground recruiters thought they had to fill quotas. People who would not agree to resettlement were threatened with imprisonment or the end of food aid by recruiters who were struggling to meet the quotas.

For those who were resettled, the conditions in the resettlements were dire. The land had been bush land for twenty years and needed to be cleared, but people lacked the proper tools to work the land, build houses, and establish livelihoods. There was inadequate water supply, and increased health risks were common. The anopheles mosquito (which transmits malaria) and the tsetse fly (which transmits livestock disease that kills oxen and causes sleeping sickness in humans) thrived in the low-land resettlement areas, and the resettled people from the highlands (where the insects do not exist) faced unfamiliar threats. Conflicts erupted within the camps and between the camps and local communities. In some areas return was as high as 36 percent (p. 533), but the majority could not afford the return travel to go back to their communities of origin. The BBC reported that people were opting to walk back to their homes, even if it took them a month, than stay in the resettlement camps. Hammond reported that at the time of writing (2007), the government was planning to continue the programme.


4.1.4 National trafficking

Trafficking of women and children in Ethiopia from rural to urban communities is feared to be increasing, but there are no exact numbers to substantiate this flow. Children are trafficked to work as domestic workers, in cottage industries such as weaving, or into prostitution. Both boys (aged 8 to 14) and girls (aged 8 to 24) are trafficked, but the number of girls trafficked is substantially larger than boys. Recruitment generally occurs through facilitators who are family, friends, or trusted community members who work for a broker and receive a commission. Facilitators are trusted by the families and often seen as helping the families by connecting them with a broker and finding opportunities for the children. When a bad situation materializes, the facilitator is not blamed and the broker is often not either, so the situation is repeated within other families in the community (IOM, no year).

4.2 International Migration Flows

International migration flows out of Ethiopia are relatively small. The World Bank cites an emigration rate of 0.6 percent of the population in 2005, which amounts to a stock of 445,926 persons (2008). Figure 2 illustrates the destination of Ethiopian migrants. Studies have demonstrated that Ethiopian migrants generally spend 1-3 years in neighbouring countries (such as Kenya, Djibouti, or Somalia) before immigrating to the west. Ethiopian refugees residing in refugee camps in neighbouring countries may also receive resettlement in other countries further abroad, as in the case of 130 Ethiopian refugees who were resettled in the UK in 2006 (Collyer and de Guerre, 2007).

Figure 2: Proportion of Ethiopia's International Migration Stock, Residence by Continent: 2000-2002



Source: World Bank, 2008.

In urban areas the high unemployment rates lead to a perpetuated dream of international migration. Young men spend their days dreaming of winning the US Diversity Lottery Visa and being able to migrate to a better life (Mains, 2007, p. 668). Some Ethiopians do win the US Diversity Lottery Visa, which requires having a sponsor in the US, but the majority of young men do not have a sponsor or a real

chance of realizing this dream. In 2009 5,200 Ethiopians won the US Diversity Lottery Visa (US Bureau of Consular Affairs, 2009).

4.2.1 International refugees

In 2009 a total of 85,250 Ethiopians were listed by the UNHCR as people of concern. Table 3 illustrates the countries in which Ethiopian refugees are residing. As this table shows, most Ethiopian refugees fled to Kenya, Sudan, and a combination of other countries. Most of these refugees are assisted by the UNHCR.

Table 3: Host Countries of Ethiopian Refugees: January 2009

Country	Total of Ethiopian refugees in country	Assisted by UNHCR
Kenya	23,500	23,500
Somalia	5,600	5,600
Sudan	16,523	10,050
Yemen	800	800
Other Countries	37,160	
Asylum Seekers	1,667	
Total	85,250	

Source: UNHCR, 2009.

Net inward migration into Ethiopia in 2005 was 554,000, or 0.7 percent of the total Ethiopian population. The World Bank thus considers the net migrant flow of Ethiopia to be zero because in- and out-migration balance one another out. Table 4 illustrates the number of refugees in Ethiopia by country of origin.

Table 4: Number of people under UNHCR concern in Ethiopia: January 2009

Refugee type	Origin	Total in country	Of whom assisted by UNHCR
Refugees	Eritrea	32,590	32,590
	Somalia	40,390	40,390
	Sudan	23,750	23,750
	Various	4,460	4,460
Asylum-seekers	Various	120	120
Total		101,310	101,310

Source: UNHCR, 2009.

4.2.2 International trafficking

One of largest current international migration flows is Ethiopian women migrating to the Middle East as domestic workers, which also often occurs through trafficking. The UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (2009) defines trafficking to include use of “coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability...” (Article 3). In the case of Ethiopian women going to the Middle East, the initial migration decision is made by their own free will. They are, however, given misinformation regarding the position

and circumstances waiting for them in the host country. Numbers of trafficked women are unknown but are estimated to be as large as 130,000 Ethiopian women and children in the Gulf States (IOM, no year). The top destinations are Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the United Arab Emirates (IOM, no year).

The profile and methods of international trafficking are similar to internal trafficking. Women trafficked to the Middle East are generally between 20-30 years of age, and children as young as 13 are trafficked (IOM, no year). The women who leave are living in poverty, and few have completed high school. The majority of women being internationally trafficked are from urban areas, with a large number coming from Addis Ababa. International trafficking often occurs via the same method that internal trafficking does: through brokers who connect to people through facilitations. Again, facilitators are known by the individual and trusted (IOM, no year).

Women and children who migrate to the Middle East will often do so using a tourist visa and claim to be travelling for a religious pilgrimage. In the past they would fly directly from the Addis Ababa airport. Due to the establishment of an immigration office at the airport that requires people to show work permits before they leave, it is now more common for people to go to neighbouring countries prior to departing (IOM, no year). This makes it more difficult for the government to track their citizens' migration.

Ethiopian women working as domestic workers in the Middle East are described as suffering inadequate working conditions and physical and sexual abuse (Anbesse et al., 2009, p. 560). Women have described having their passports taken away so they cannot leave, being expected to work 24 hours per day, and not being able to have contact with other Ethiopians. The study by Anbesse et al. (2009) described how these conditions lead to 'social defeat' of the migrant women. From 1999-2005 the Quarantine Office of the Addis Ababa International Airport reported 129 female bodies returned from Jeddah, Dubai, and Beirut (IOM, no year, p. 53). In all cases the cause of death was determined to be suicide (IOM, no year, p. 53). The study conducted by Anbesse et al. (2009) on returnees from the Middle East to Ethiopia arose due to the observations of the number of return migrants seeking professional psychiatric help. The authors suggest that this is just the tip of the iceberg of mental disorders experienced by female migrants, and it is an area of concern.


5. The Diaspora

The flow of migrants from Ethiopia led to the emergence of the Ethiopian Diaspora around the world. Abye (2004 in Lyons, 2007) identifies four stages of the growth of the Ethiopian Diaspora. The first occurred before 1974 and was comprised primarily of elites. The second wave occurred from 1974-1982, when people fled the Derg's Red Terror. The third wave occurred from 1982 to 1991 and was largely comprised of family reunification to the west. The fourth wave occurred post-1991 as people fled ethnic violence and political repression. In this section the Ethiopian Diaspora will be described along with their involvement in their home country.

5.1 Sizes of Ethiopian Diaspora around the world

The total estimated size of the Ethiopian Diaspora in all OECD countries is 146,100 people. Figure 3 highlights the estimated size of the Ethiopian Diaspora in OECD countries (OECD, 2005). The population sizes are determined primarily by country census data from 2000-2001. Figure 3 also shows that the Ethiopian Diaspora is highly concentrated in the United States, followed by smaller numbers in Canada, Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. Other estimates of the Ethiopian population in the United States indicate that there may be 73,000 Ethiopian-born residents and 460,000 Ethiopian-descended residents (Lyons, 2007 from Solomon, 2007). These numbers pose a wide departure from the OECD numbers presented in Figure 3, which places the US native-born population at 46,920.

Figure 3: Estimates of the Size of the Ethiopian Diaspora in OECD Countries



Source: OECD, 2005.

The Ethiopian Diaspora is also represented in Asia and the Middle East. Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics in 2005 reported that the Ethiopia-origin population was 105,500 (Terrazas, 2007). Estimates of the Ethiopian Diaspora in other countries include 90,000 in Saudi Arabia and 30,000 in Lebanon (Terrazas, 2007). In addition, Bulcha (2002) estimates that there are at least 100,000 Oromo living in Kenya, Djibouti, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Somalia.

5.2 Divisions within the Diaspora

Ethnic groups and political views divide the Ethiopian Diaspora. Lyons (2007), for example, identifies three groups within the Ethiopian Diaspora, particularly in the United States. The first is comprised of groups that collectively oppose the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (ERPFD) (current party in power) due to their policy of ethnic federalism and call for a unified pan-Ethiopian agenda. This group originated from the All Amhara People's Organization, which became the All-Ethiopian Unity Party, and they support the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) political party in Ethiopia. Opponents of this group chastise it for being 'Amhara chauvinistic', but the group maintains support for Ethiopian unity.

The second wing supports the concept of ethnic federalism but is in opposition to the current regime. This group is composed of ethnic and regional parties with links to the United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF), the Southern Coalition, and the Oromo National Congress. This group has close links to political organizations in Ethiopia and is more willing to work with the current government in support of ethnic autonomy.

The third group is the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), which rejects the notion of Ethiopia as a unified state and supports the independence of Oromo and Oromyia. The OLF emerged in 1974 in opposition to political abuse of the Oromo, and it fights for freedom of the ethnic homeland. The OLF are a specific ethnic group seeking freedom for the expression of the collective Oromo identity.

The Ethiopian Diaspora is thus comprised of disparate groups. These groups are not necessarily ethnically based, but there are ethnic divisions among the Diaspora. Lyons' (2007) typology does not include the Oromo Diaspora, which is not necessarily included in the OLF category. The Oromo Diaspora emerged in the 1970s as people fled Mengistu's regime. In the beginning of the Diaspora, the key activity was to express the culture of what it meant to be Oromo. Scholars began to articulate the history of Ethiopia from an Oromo perspective. Today this perspective is widely accepted as an accurate representation of Ethiopian history. Since 2000 the Oromo Diaspora has become more active in politics to improve the situation of the Oromo within the Diaspora and the homeland.

It is important to note that the Oromo Diaspora rejects the term 'Ethiopia'. For this group the term Ethiopia represents colonialism and repression. Being "Ethiopian" is thus not part of their self-identity. A study by Collyer and de Guerre (2006) examines the resettlement process of a group of Oromo and Amhara refugees to the UK from Kenya, where the politics of Oromo and Amhara divided the group in the forming of an organization. The Oromo members of the group rejected the term Ethiopia and formed an Oromo Society, which the Amhara members were welcome to join but did not. This study illustrates that the ethnic groups and names that are used are of great significance to the members of the Diaspora.

5.3 Involvement of the Diaspora

The Diaspora has created numerous organizations, groups, radio and television broadcasts, and media sites to connect people within the Diaspora and to engage them in Ethiopia (Lyons, 2007). The Ethiopian Yellow Pages in the US serves as a resource to connect members of the Diaspora with Ethiopian services. The Ethiopian Sports Federation of North America maintains their own football league and has an annual football tournament that is a major event, drawing tens of thousands of people (Lyons, 2007). The Ethiopia North America Health Professionals Association brings together health professionals in the Diaspora to offer distance learning partnerships, specialized training for Ethiopian medical professionals, visiting surgical teams, and financial support for health care in Ethiopia.

Members of the Diaspora are highly engaged in Ethiopian politics, as was illustrated in the 2005 elections. During the 2005 elections the Diaspora supported opposition groups to the ERPDF (notably the Coalition for Unity and Democracy [CUD]), and members of the opposition flew to North America and Europe to engage in the political debates. After the 2005 elections and global consensus of challenges in the process, the Diaspora encouraged and supported the CUD in the decision to boycott congress. This led to the ERPDF charging 131 of the CUD members in Ethiopia on the basis of treason and genocide. In addition, the ERPDF claimed members of the Diaspora were 'extremists' that were largely responsible for the conflict (Lyons, 2007). Seventeen Diaspora members were charged with treason and genocide and indicted by the ERPDF, which illustrates the transnational ties of the CUD. In addition, opposition blogs based abroad were blocked in Ethiopia.

Due to the 2005 events, the Diaspora was actively involved in fundraising; lobbying the US Congress, the European Union, and the World Bank, and; engaging in political debates. The Diaspora became active in supporting the passing of the Ethiopia Democracy and Accountability Act of 2007 by testifying before the US Congress, circulating petitions in support of the bill, and fundraising. Protests and demonstrations were held around the world, which launched the efforts into a global campaign of the Diaspora (Lyons, 2007).

It is evident that members of the Diaspora are actively involved in the politics of Ethiopia. National debates have taken on a transnational dimension as they broadcast on media sites to involve the Diaspora. Key leaders within politics are members of the Diaspora, and many have influential voices. The Diaspora also provides the funds that support the activities of opposition parties in Ethiopia. The Diaspora has become a central element in National politics (Lyons, 2007).

6. Migration and Development

The Ethiopian emigration patterns that were described in previous chapters represent a substantial outflow of human capital from the country. This might have a negative impact on Ethiopia's development processes. There are positive consequences of emigration as well, however, such as remittances and the return migration of Ethiopians who received extra schooling abroad. Both the positive and negative consequences of migration on development processes in Ethiopia are discussed below.

6.1 Skilled emigration from Ethiopia

Even though the net costs of emigration for migrant-sending countries is difficult to quantify, many authors agree upon the fact that Ethiopia has suffered substantially from 'brain drain', or the out-migration of highly-skilled Ethiopians over the years (see e.g. Aredo, 1998; El-Khawas, 2004; ICMPD, 2008; Reinert, 2006). As was described in Chapter 4, young Ethiopians often dream of a better future and leave their country in pursuit of this dream. It is difficult for a poor country such as Ethiopia to create a stable and work-friendly environment for highly-skilled society members. This, in combination with increasing opportunities elsewhere due to a globalizing world, leads to an outflow of skilled people (Reinert, 2006).

Ethiopia is one of the countries in the world most affected by a so-called 'medical brain drain'. It is posited that many Ethiopian medical doctors migrate to work in Europe and North America, which results in a lack of skilled medical staff in Ethiopia (El-Khawas, 2004). The out-migration of Ethiopian medical staff is estimated at 25.6 percent (Docquier & Bhargava, 2006), and 29.7 percent (Clemens & Petterson, 2006) of all medical staff trained in Ethiopia is estimated to migrate. In general the emigration rate of tertiary educated individuals is estimated at 17.0 percent (Docquier & Marfouk, 2006). This, combined with the fact that educational attainment in Ethiopia in general is still very low compared to the education levels of other African countries, and the fact that highly-educated professionals are few, leads to a substantial shortage of the skilled work force in Ethiopia (Berhanu et al., 2004). This shortage most likely affects rural areas more strongly, since skilled labour is rare in those areas to begin with (ibid.).

The Ethiopian government has taken some initiative to reverse the negative effects resulting from brain drain. It has, for example, tried to mobilize its skilled professionals living in the Diaspora for development projects in Ethiopia (ICMPD, 2008). The number of returnees to Ethiopia is low, however, which shows that the Ethiopian government is not able to pull its citizens back by means of providing sufficient opportunities for them (ICMPD, 2008).

6.2 Remittances to Ethiopia


One of the positive effects of the out-migration flows from Ethiopia is the inflow of remittances from Ethiopian citizens who migrated abroad. As described in Chapter 2, Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world. Remittances are important in Ethiopia in the sense that they constitute a large share of foreign capital inflows (Reinert, 2006). The National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) controls formal remittance flows and keeps track of all financial transfers (ICMPD, 2008).

The estimates of the exact value of remittances that enter the country vary substantially. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimated the total inflow of remittances for Ethiopia in 2007 at US \$359 million. The average value of remittances received per person was US \$4. This is low

when compared to an average of US \$26 dollars per person for Sub-Saharan Africa (UNDP, 2009). The National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) estimated the inflow of remittances at US \$636.2 million in 2007, but this number reflects only the formally-recorded flow of remittances. Since the informal flow of remittances is estimated at 45 to 60 percent of formal remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa (Freund & Spatafora, 2005), the real financial inflow of remittances is expected to be much higher. In 2008 the NBE reported much high remittance amounts, with one billion dollars worth of remittances received from Ethiopian and foreign nationals in the year 2007-2008.

Figure 4 illustrates the official flow of remittances as a percentage of GDP from 2000-2006 (left side in blue) and the amount of remittances received in millions of USD from 2000-2006 (right side in green). The amount of remittances in USD has more than tripled from 2000 (\$53 million) to 2006 (\$172 million).


Figure 4: Flow of Remittances as a Percentage of GDP (blue) and Flow of Remittances Received in millions of USD (green)



Source: UNDP, 2009.

Figure 5 illustrates the percentage of remittance flows per sending continent (UNDP, 2009). Although Asia accounts for the largest stock of Ethiopian migrants (37 percent), North America accounts for the largest remittance flows in dollar value (41 percent). The exact reason for this is unknown and would be based on speculation.

Figure 5: Percentage of Remittance Flows by Continent



Source: UNDP, 2009.

6.3 Development impact of remittances in Ethiopia

Whatever its exact value, the impact of the inflow of financial remittances is substantial in Ethiopia (Reinert, 2006). Remittances play a large role in financial household dynamics in Ethiopia. Remittances are mainly used as risk-reducing instruments and as insurance against external shocks (Aredo, 2005). Bigsten, Kebede and Shimeles (2005) investigated income dynamics in Ethiopia for the period 1994-1997 and concluded that households in Ethiopia relied heavily on remittances in that period. In 1997 remittances were the primary source of income for 22 percent of the households in the sample in Ethiopia. Moreover, the mean share of household income provided by the remittances was 25 percent in that year. For the poorest quintile, remittances constituted almost half of the household's total income.

The Ethiopian government increasingly recognizes the importance of remittances from its migrants for the development of the country and has taken a number of initiatives to optimize the effects of these financial flows. One of their goals was to stimulate its Diaspora members to send money through formal channels. The National Bank of Ethiopia, for example, issued a directive on international remittance services in 2006, which served three main objectives: 1) to improve the operations of the formal remittance service in Ethiopia; 2) to make remittances transfers more cost-effective, and; 3) to make the international remittance service in Ethiopia more accessible, more reliable, and faster (NBE, 2006). Most financial transfers are still made through informal channels, however, which make it difficult to influence and eventually utilize this financial flow (ICMPD, 2008).

7. Policies and Programmes Regarding Ethiopian Migration

Migration policies in Ethiopia are implemented by the Government of Ethiopia, at the African Union level, and through the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Each of these will be examined in this section.

7.1 Ethiopian Expatriate Affairs

In 2002, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Government established the General Directorate in charge of Ethiopian Expatriate Affairs (EEA). Ideally the EEA:

- “Serves as a liaison between different Ministries and Ethiopians in Diaspora,
- Encourages the active involvement of the Ethiopians in Diaspora in socio-economic activities of the country,
- Safeguards the rights and privileges of Ethiopian expatriates,
- Mobilizes the Ethiopian community abroad for a sustained and organized image building.”

With the establishment of the EEA, each embassy now has a diplomat who is responsible for dealing with community issues (EEA, 2009). According to Atnafu (2006), in 2006 the EEA established regional bureaus to continue the goal of engaging the Diaspora in economic development and democratization. The Oromiya Diaspora Directorate has been active in servicing its community. The EEA has been active in engaging the Diaspora and has recognized the power of the Diaspora as a financial resource. Three Directives have been established to facilitate Diaspora investment in Ethiopia: foreign bank accounts, remittances, and a Diaspora Bond.

In 2004 the Government established a directive to allow non-resident Ethiopians and non-residents of Ethiopian origin to have a foreign currency account in Ethiopia. This was done in an effort to attract foreign investment and entrepreneurship from the Diaspora. Investments from the Diaspora have been most notable in the cut flower and horticulture business (Lyons, 2007).

In 2006 the Government of Ethiopia created a directive to regulate remittance transfers. The goals of the Directive are (National Bank of Ethiopia, 2009):

- “To improve the operations of the formal remittance service in Ethiopia
- To reduce the costs of remittance transfer system in Ethiopia
- To increase access of international remittance service for Nationals and make the service reliable, fast and safe.”

The Directive establishes regulations around rates and remittance service providers. Rates of different providers (for sending remittances to the National Bank of Ethiopia) are available on the website of the National Bank of Ethiopia, which provides transparency to the process. It appears, however, that there are 12 other banks in Ethiopia, and remittance services and partnerships are only offered through the National Bank of Ethiopia. It is unknown if the directive is enforced or provides improved services for remitters.

In 2008 Ethiopia’s first diaspora bond was issued by the state-owned power utility company Ethiopian Electric Power Corporation (EEPCO) (Negash, 2009). The bond is known as the Millennium Bond and is a corporate bond underwritten by the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (Ethiopian Embassy UK,

2009). The minimum amount is US \$500, and the interest rates are 4%, 4.5 % and 5% for five, seven, and ten years maturity (Ethiopian Embassy UK). The bonds are tax-free in Ethiopia, and interest is paid annually. At this time information is not available on the number of bonds sold.

The EEA also provides benefits to return migrants to encourage permanent return and investment in Ethiopia. Returnees are exempt from paying income tax for manufacturing, agro-industrial activities, and the production of agricultural products. Returnees are also exempt from paying custom duties on the importation of vehicles, capital goods, construction materials, and their personal and household goods. The return incentives offered by the EEA also include the provision of urban land free of charge and with lease payments for the construction of residential buildings organized into housing cooperatives. It is unknown at this time how many returnees are accessing these programmes.

7.2 African Union

Ethiopia is a member state of the Africa Union and thus a participant of the Joint Africa- EU Declaration on Migration and Development. This Declaration states that signatories will “Commit to a partnership between countries of origin, transit and destination to better manage migration in a comprehensive, holistic and balanced manner, in a spirit of shared responsibility and cooperation”. The Declaration provides guidance in the areas of migration and development; migration management challenges; peace and security; human resources and brain drain; concern for human rights and the well-being of the individual; sharing best practices; regular migration opportunities; illegal or irregular migration, and; protection of refugees.

On 22 October 2009 the African Union passed the ‘African Union Convention for the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa’ known as the Kampala Convention, of which Ethiopia was a signatory. The international migration community hailed this as a major step forward in protection for internally displaced persons. The Kampala Convention is based on the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and seeks protection of the human rights of the internally displaced by the state. The Convention will enter into force once 15 states have ratified it.

7.3 International Organization for Migration Mission in Ethiopia

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) mission to Ethiopia has an active role in facilitating migration in Ethiopia. The IOM runs the following specific programmes (IOM, 2009):

- Movement, Emergency and Post-crisis Migration Management – provides emergency assistance to flood victims and the internally displaced, and prepares refugees prior to resettlement in third countries.
- Migration Health- provides health assessments for refugees for resettlement and for visa applications.
- Migration and Development- works with the Diaspora to support Government of Ethiopia’s Development goals.
- Regulating Migration- Counter-trafficking programme that includes: counselling service for migrants, potential migrants, returnees and their families; basic assistance, training and counselling to victims of trafficking; and an information, education and communication (IEC) campaign among potential migrants, high school students and the society at large to create awareness of trafficking.

- Facilitating Migration- works with the Government of Ethiopia to strengthen border control.
- Migration Research- seeks to build capacity in research, data processing and analysis on federalism, peace-building, and conflict management for the Regional Affairs Section of the Ministry of Federal Affairs.
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The IOM in Ethiopia has done critical research on trafficking in Ethiopia that has created an understanding of how people are trafficked and the migration routes utilized to exit Ethiopia. In addition, the mission in Ethiopia provides essential services to return migrants. One study of return migrants indicated that returnees look to the IOM for support and want to see its continuance (Adamnesh, 2006).

8. Migration Relationship with the Netherlands

Ethiopians constitute one of the largest groups within the African migrant community in the Netherlands. The African community in the Netherlands consisted of more than 100,000 individuals in 2005 (Van Heelsum, 2005). In 2009 almost 11,000 African immigrants in the Netherlands were from Ethiopia or Eritrea (CBS, 2009), and they are mostly concentrated in Dutch urban areas (Blakely, 2005). The immigration of Ethiopians into the Netherlands, as well as their immigration motives, will be discussed in the next paragraph.

8.1 Immigration of Ethiopians into the Netherlands

Within the most recent waves of African asylum seekers in the Netherlands, which started around 1976, Ethiopians were one of the earliest migrant groups. Among the most important reasons for Ethiopians to seek asylum in the Netherlands were the ecological circumstances in Ethiopia such as famines, the violent Mengistu regime, and the ongoing war with Eritrea over its independence (Blakely, 2005). These are the general push factors for Ethiopians that were also discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.

In the period 1995-2008 the number of Ethiopians and Eritreans living in the Netherlands increased from almost 8,000 to almost 11,000 (CBS, 2009).¹ Table 5 shows the number of Ethiopian and Eritrean immigrants for the period 1995-2008 and their different motives to immigrate. As this table illustrates, from 1995 to 2002 the main immigration motive for Ethiopians and Eritreans was to seek asylum. This finding is confirmed in a study conducted by Papadopoulos et al. (2004) on Ethiopians in the UK, which found that over half of the Ethiopians in the sample had fled their home country as a result of political oppression, including: “oppression due to ethnic background, political activity, lack of freedom to express opinion, harassment and coercion into joining allegiance with the ruling political party, corruption, to avoid being conscripted to war or escape the consequences of war” (p. 60). Currently, however, the main immigration motives for Ethiopians and Eritreans migrating to the Netherlands are for study and family reunion.

Table 5: Ethiopian/Eritrean Immigrants and Immigration Motives: 1995-2007

	Time-line												
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Number of immigrants	472	390	313	303	338	443	532	476	348	322	322	354	397
Motives													
Work	-	4	7	13	7	17	14	8	12	12	19	15	15
Asylum	338	184	115	119	139	234	287	231	75	37	46	68	51
Family reunion	95	78	85	79	73	64	71	67	86	67	54	64	86
Study	19	67	48	58	71	45	94	111	118	126	129	161	177
Au-pair	-	2	2	-	1	2	-	1	2	-	3	1	10
Other	21	57	54	34	48	81	66	61	55	83	70	49	62

Source: CBS Statline, 2009.

¹ Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993. Therefore, the Ethiopians and Eritreans are often considered as one group in statistics.

8.2 Characteristics of Ethiopian immigrants in the Netherlands

The Ethiopian population in the Netherlands is relatively young and gender balanced. As can be seen in Table 6, most Ethiopians in the Netherlands are roughly between 20 and 40 years of age. In 2003 almost 40 percent of the Ethiopians and Eritreans in the Netherlands was younger than 15 (Van Heelsum, 2005). Even though more Ethiopian men than women immigrated into the Netherlands, the gender differences are not large. The vast majority of Ethiopians, almost 70 percent in 2009, are first generation immigrants (CBS, 2009).

Table 6: Ethiopians in the Netherlands by Age and Gender: 1996, 2003, 2009

Age	1996		2003		2009	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
0 – 10 years	946	833	1149	1022	1080	1009
10 – 20 years	601	568	942	888	940	834
20 – 30 years	1318	858	772	917	955	1001
30 – 40 years	1307	787	1465	1025	1057	1016
40 – 50 years	424	199	922	587	1138	858
50 – 60 years	73	35	242	120	548	330
60 – 70 years	14	12	44	12	101	52
70 – 80 years	0	3	2	10	15	9
80 > years	0	0	0	1	0	3
Total	4683	3295	5538	4582	5834	5112
Grand total	7978		10120		10946	

Source: CBS Statline, 2009.

It is difficult for Ethiopians, as well as for other African immigrants in the Netherlands, to find employment. This is mainly due to language barriers, cultural barriers, and low levels of education. Ethiopians have a relatively higher unemployment rate compared to other African immigrants, and only few Ethiopians work at the maximum level of their ability (Blakely, 2005). In 2005 40.4 percent of the first-generation Ethiopians between 15 and 65 years of age living in the Netherlands had a job. For the second-generation Ethiopians, this number was somewhat higher at 43.4 percent (CBS, 2009). Ethiopians acquire better Dutch-language skills than other African groups in the Netherlands (Blakely, 2005).

8.3 Emigration of Ethiopians from the Netherlands

From 1995 to 2003 the Netherlands has experienced a positive migration rate for Ethiopian migrants.² More Ethiopians have immigrated to than emigrated from the Netherlands. This was not the case from 2003 to 2005, when the migration rate was negative, but from 2006 onwards it rose again (CBS, 2009). Most of the Ethiopians that left the Netherlands were between 20 and 50 years of age (see Table 7), and

² This migration rate is calculated by subtracting the number of emigrants from the number of immigrants.

the majority of emigrants was male (see Table 8) and single (CBS, 2009). Why men emigrate more than female is not known.

Table 7: Ethiopian Emigrants from the Netherlands by Age Group: 1995-2008

Age	Time-line													
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
0 – 10 years	4	3	4	11	6	1	9	17	12	13	13	4	11	4
10 – 20 years	10	7	18	11	8	18	14	48	49	29	18	23	12	10
20 – 30 years	6	78	95	78	70	72	98	72	106	93	107	99	89	71
30 – 40 years	88	114	128	115	104	113	106	159	151	170	153	156	155	121
40 – 50 years	20	21	32	23	28	24	39	36	53	67	82	67	81	84
50 – 60 years	2	2	7	6	3	5	8	2	12	12	17	14	12	27
60 – 70 years	3	0	1	3	1	0	2	4	4	3	2	2	2	2
70 – 80 years	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	2	0	1	1	2	0	0
80 > years	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	368	450	586	486	432	482	568	670	776	776	768	748	710	636

Source: CBS Statline, 2009.

8.4 Ethiopian Diaspora organizations in the Netherlands

Ethiopians in the Netherlands have set up different organizations and groups, and many of them are involved in development issues in Ethiopia (for an overview, see e.g. Kusters et al., 2006). Most Ethiopian organizations in the Netherlands are formed along ethnic, political, or religious lines (Van Heelsum, 2005). As a result the activities in their home country are often directed to members of the same group (Ongayo, 2009).

Ethiopians in the Netherlands have developed active Diaspora organizations. The Dutch government provided a legislative and institutional framework to develop Ethiopian organizations, and diaspora organizations in general, in the Netherlands. This, in combination with the emotional attachment of many Ethiopians to their home land and their concerns about the political, economic, and ecological situation in Ethiopia, made Ethiopian organizations flourish in the Netherlands (Ongayo, 2009). As with the Ethiopian Diaspora worldwide, the Ethiopian Diaspora in the Netherlands is very heterogeneous in terms of opinions and background of its members. This is also an aspect that most likely led to the extensity of the Ethiopian Diaspora organizations in the Netherlands. To quote Ongayo (2009): “The Ethiopian diaspora in the Netherlands is remarkably well organised through the various formal and informal organisations that have been formed, which can be explained by its diversity and wide range of opinions, which in turn opens up many possibilities to create new organisations” (p. 5).

The most important Diaspora organization for Ethiopians in the Netherlands is the Union of Ethiopians in the Netherlands (VEN). This organization has more than 600 members and is one of the largest migrant organizations in the Netherlands. VEN has strong ties with the Eastern Orthodox Church and is largely involved in political and societal processes in Ethiopia (Blakely, 2005).

8.5 Policy relationships between Ethiopia and the Netherlands and the EU

The relationship between the EU and Ethiopia is governed by the Cotonou Agreement, which was signed between the EU and ACP countries in 2000, and the Lome Convention, which was signed in 1975. The EU opened its Delegation in Ethiopia in 1975 and since its conception has allocated a total of €2.7 billion

to Ethiopia, excluding emergency aid. The goal of the EU mission to Ethiopia is to eradicate poverty through sustainable development, democracy, peace, and security.

Key achievements of the EU in Ethiopia include the development of infrastructure and aid effectiveness programmes. According to the EC (2009a) “Asphalt roads in good condition have risen from 43% to 60%; gravel roads in the same condition have increased from 31% to 45%; rural roads in good condition have grown by 6% while road density has further increased”.

In 2007 the European Commission and the Government of Ethiopia signed the EC-Ethiopia Country Strategy Paper for 2008-2013 with a total budget of €644 million (EC, 2009b). Ethiopia is one of the largest recipients of aid from the Africa, Pacific, and Caribbean countries. The objective of the Joint Response Strategy is for the EC to assist Ethiopia in making decisive action towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The EC’s contribution to the Response Strategy is built around three focal sectors: “Transport and regional integration; Rural development and food security, and; Macroeconomic support and governance.” Additional support will be provided in the areas of environment, culture, biological heritage conservation, and de-mining (EC, 2009). The EC-Ethiopia joint initiative does not appear to have any specific migration policies but maintains adherence with EC-EU migration policies.

8.6 The Role of the IOM in the Netherlands

The Office of the IOM in The Hague has recently begun a Temporary Return of Qualified Nationals Programme (TRQN) (which is funded by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs) for individuals with permanent residence in the Netherlands who are also Ethiopian nationals. The TRQN programme matches government organizations, non-governmental organizations, and private companies in Ethiopia with Ethiopians in the Netherlands who have a desired skill. The individual is then funded by the IOM to work on a specific project in Ethiopia for three months. A requirement of the programme is that the project trains other individuals so that when the individual returns to the Netherlands, the trainee in Ethiopia will continue the position. As of November 2009, the programme was in initial stages and no temporary returns had been implemented (pers. Comm., Nov. 2009).

9. Future Perspectives on Ethiopian Migration: Trends & Challenges

Migration flows from and within Africa are expected to remain substantial in the future (Spaan & Van Moppes, 2006; World Bank, 2009). The largest migration flow worldwide is from developing to developed countries (Martin & Zucher, 2008). These migration flows pose challenges to the countries involved, including both the sending and receiving countries. For the African case, according to Adepoju (2008): “Sub-Saharan Africa is facing daunting challenges in respect of increasing irregular migration, migrants’ rights, human trafficking and the emigration of skilled professionals” (p. 57). For developed countries illegal migration, trafficking, managing immigration, circular migration flows, and return migration issues will be high on the political agenda (Martin & Adepoju, 2008; Zucher, 2008).

For Ethiopia in particular, human rights violations and conflict will continue to drive migration flows, both within and out of the country (IDMC, 2009b). In addition, the high poverty levels Ethiopia currently faces will drive people to look for better opportunities elsewhere. Urbanization is a trend that will pose challenges to Ethiopia, and Africa in general, in the future. As described in this paper, more and more Ethiopians seek better opportunities in Ethiopia’s largest cities (Berhanu & White, 2000; Ezra & Kiros, 2001). By the year 2020 it is anticipated that around 22 million Ethiopians will live in the cities. This might lead to increasing unemployment levels in the cities, which might in turn result in higher cross-border migration flows (ICMPD, 2008).

Employment opportunities are likely to become one of the major drivers of migration in the future in Africa (Adepoju, 2008) as a result of low opportunities in combination with Africa’s relatively young population (Spaan & Van Moppes, 2006). This is the case for Ethiopia as well given the current urbanization trends and high levels of unemployment (Financial Standards Forum, 2009).

Remittances are expected to decrease in the future as a result of the global economic crisis. The World Bank (2009) already reports a 6.1 percent decline of remittances from 2008 to 2009. “[...] remittance flows are likely to face three downside risks: a jobless economic recovery, tighter immigration controls, and unpredictable exchange rate movements” (p. 1). For Ethiopia the National Bank (NBE, 2009) reported a 9.6 percent decline of remittances in the year 2008-2009. The financial crisis has also highlighted the importance of remittances for development, however, and remittances are expected to continue being a more important capital flow than other capital flows (ibid.). Highly skilled migration from Africa, however, is increasing (Adepoju, 2008), which leads to a lack of labour in the migrant-sending country but could also provide new opportunities for remittances. This is the case for Ethiopia as well, since it a country characterized by highly-skilled emigration patterns.

The migration-development link for migrant-sending countries is important, and better policies are needed to exploit the potentials of migration for development. To quote Spaan & Van Moppes (2006, p. 4):

“A sustained and concerted effort is needed on the part of African governments in order to mainstream migration in development policy and adequately address issues of migration management, brain drain, remittances, xenophobia, migrant rights, return migration and the socio-economic effects on communities of origin”.

In addition, a global network among migrant-sending countries, migrant-receiving countries, and international organizations should be established to stimulate dialogue and curtail global migration issues such as trafficking, illegal migration, and brain drain (ibid.). An example of this cooperation is the mobility partnership agreements signed by the EU and migrant-sending countries to manage migration flows (Martin & Zurcher, 2008). In order for development policies governing migration to succeed, however, the root causes of migration flows and their dynamics should be sufficiently understood and addressed (Adepoju, 2008).

10. Conclusion

Migration in Ethiopia is and has historically been characterized by complex flows arising from a combination of root causes. These root causes have included poverty, drought, political repression, forced repatriation, and forced resettlement. It is evident that extreme poverty and poor governance have been and continue to be key driving forces for Ethiopian migration. Without increased food security, infrastructure, and employment opportunities, it can be anticipated that migration flows out of Ethiopia will continue.

Migration flows from Ethiopia have been largely characterized by refugee flows and increasingly by skilled migration and trafficking. Refugee flows are still occurring today as people continue to flee political repression, but the large flows of the 1990s have decreased, and more people are returning from neighbouring countries. Skilled migration from Ethiopia has been increasing since the 1990s, especially within the health profession, as there is an international demand for health care workers. The government of Ethiopia has sought to encourage the return of skilled migrants by offering tax breaks and other incentives to entice return. It appears, however, that due to the poor living conditions in Ethiopia, skilled workers are not attracted to return. Trafficking has become an increasing problem both internally and internationally from Ethiopia as women and children are exploited into the domestic work and prostitution. Some of the problems of trafficking are being addressed by the IOM in Ethiopia, which seeks to assist victims and provide education. Without addressing the root causes of vulnerability it appears that trafficking will continue, however.

The development impacts from migration in Ethiopia are multifaceted. Official remittance flows are relatively low as a percentage of GDP when compared to other Sub-Saharan African countries. One possible reason for this is that in recent years Ethiopia has had relatively low levels of emigration. Nevertheless, one study indicated that as many as 22 percent of households rely on remittances as a primary source of household income. The impacts of remittances on development are widely known, and the government of Ethiopia has sought to establish formal channels for remittances through policies with the National Bank of Ethiopia.

The Diaspora has had an influential voice in Ethiopian politics and development over the past decade, but the impact of the Diaspora is contradictory. The Ethiopian Diaspora is fractured and in conflict with each other, which Lyons (2007) argues perpetuates conflict in Ethiopia. The power of the Diaspora is also unevenly spread, as it appears the Diaspora in North America and Europe are the most vocal and influential despite the fact that the largest percentage of the Diaspora lives in Asia. One possible reason for this is that more of the Ethiopian elite have migrated to North America and Europe instead of Asia. The role of the Diaspora in development is thus paradoxical, as the Diaspora has organized many NGOs and organizations for development in Ethiopia yet the divisions within the Diaspora does not aid the political development of the country.

It is a fairly likely estimation that migration flows from Ethiopia will continue to increase due to limited employment opportunities, poverty, overpopulation, food scarcity, and political instability. Migration is a livelihood strategy for many people within Ethiopia, and international migration is a desirable option for both skilled and unskilled individuals in search of better opportunities. It appears that

until large-scale development and change occurs in Ethiopia, international migration will be a desired possibility for many Ethiopians.

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